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Questioning Our Principles:
Anthropological Contributions to Ethical
Dilemmas in Clinical Practice
This paper presents an analysis of the applicability of a principalist approach for a global, or cross-cultural, bioethics. We focus
especially on the principle of individual autonomy, a core value in
ethical discourse. We echo some long-standing criticisms of other
anthropologists, sociologists, and many medical ethicists, that the
individualistic approach to autonomy is a Euro-American value and
cannot be ethically applied in all settings. As a remedy, we have
suggested an adaptation of Kleinman’s Explanatory Model approach
to questions of decision-making.1 We argue that the analysis and
resolution of ethical dilemmas might also benefit from forms of
pedagogy that integrate anthropological and other social science
perspectives, and the incorporation of ethnographic techniques in
ethical practice.
We begin our discussion with a case.
Case 1
Mr. R is an Asian man with seriously compromised lung function.
He has been hospitalized for several months and is currently on a
ventilator. The ICU medical team wants to remove him from life
support but the family, consisting of his wife and two daughters, has
so far declined.
An ethics consult is arranged to mediate between the ICU
personnel and the family. The family has been in the U.S. for about
six years and the wife does not speak English. An interpreter is
present. A physician begins by asking the wife, through the
interpreter, “Do you think your husband would want to be like this?
Do you think he is happy?” He then shows an X-Ray of the patient’s
lungs to demonstrate the gravity of Mr. R’s condition.
A bilingual friend arrives. The physicians present options: place
the patient on a ward with a DNR order and the understanding that he
will not be moved back to the ICU; or send him home with a
ventilator (although the family has already said that everyone works
extensive hours and no one will be available to stay with him).
Because he is not a citizen, there are no nursing homes available (in
this state) for transferring a ventilator dependent patient. The family
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friend translates for his wife: “She is his wife, she cannot say whether
he is happy. As his wife, she does not know what he would want. It is
not possible for her to decide. Also, she believes that, as a Catholic,
she cannot choose to withdraw him from life support. She wants him
to stay in the ICU on the machine.”
At this point in the consult, the medical team is visibly angry,
stating in English that his condition is irreversible and they need his
room for someone who might live. It’s an economic issue. They also
comment that the family is wrong in their understanding of church
policy on withdrawing life support.
What can ethnographic or cultural analysis add to our understanding of this or other such cases? There are a variety of issues in
this case that easily lend themselves to anthropological exposition.
Mutual exploration of the following themes by ethicists and
anthropologists might generate rich material to shape the resolution of
this dilemma:
• Patriarchal family and customary gender roles,
• Individual vs family (collective) focus of decisions,
• Negotiating religious interpretations,
• Discussing death—how appropriate is open discussion,
• Truth-telling as acceptable or not,
• Issues of distributive justice—(how do and how should we
respond to the reality that if this patient lived in New York or
Illinois, he could, as a non-citizen, be moved to a nursing home
on life support, as his family wishes?).
Our fundamental objective in this discussion is to interrogate the
problematic biomedical/Euro-American bias toward the individual
and over-reliance on a Euro-American bioethics approach.
Introduction to Four Principles Approach
The Four Principles approach in bioethics, made famous by
Beauchamp and Childress in the five editions of their classic text on
biomedical ethics (1979, 1983, 1989, 1994, 2001), is the hallmark of
the discipline, the theoretical center from which much of the field of
bioethics has grown. Although much critiqued by ethicists from
diverse standpoints and by anthropologists (for example, physiciananthropologists Kleinman2 and Helman3 argue cogently against
assuming the relevance of Euro-centric premises in clinical practice),
2
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these principles continue as implicit, if not explicit, premises
underlying analysis of ethical issues and decision making in clinical
settings. Indeed, a cursory review of recent scholarship immediately
illustrates the enduring reliance on Beauchamp and Childress for an
ethical framework for theory and practice.4 O’Neill, for example,
opens a discussion on “Practical Principles, Practical Judgment” by
stating that the most well-known approach to bioethical reasoning that
appeals to principles remains that of Beauchamp and Childress.5
Similarly, Annas, writing in the New England Journal of Medicine,
critiques the recent Terri Schiavo case, and emphasizes the importance of patients’ rights, as consistent with American values and constitutional traditions.6 He quotes the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court on the sanctity of individual choice and self-determination
as fundamental constituents of life.7 The principle of individual
autonomy as core to ethical considerations is again reiterated.
As an ethical framework, the principles approach is an
“attempt[s] to identify and justify” a given set of moral norms for the
“guidance of and evaluation of conduct.”8 The principles are
described as “four clusters of moral principles” and include:
1. Respect for Autonomy—a norm of respecting the decisionmaking capacities of individual persons,
2. Nonmaleficence—a norm of avoiding the causation of harm,
3. Beneficence—a group of norms for, not only, “doing good,”
but balancing those good works against the risks and costs
associated with the effort,
4. Justice—a group of norms for distributing benefits, risk, and
costs fairly.9
Beauchamp and Childress have settled on these principles using
assumptions about a “common morality” which they define as:
[T]he set of norms that all morally serious persons
share . . . [It] contains moral norms that bind all
persons in all places; no norms are more basic to
moral life . . . [and it is] the morality that serves as
our common heritage.10
To utilize these principles in practice, Beauchamp and Childress
outline several rules. They insist that, “Principles are general norms
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that leave considerable room for judgment in many cases.” More
detailed “rules” and “judgments” are therefore required and “function
as precise action guides that inform us in each circumstance how to
act.”11 Some of these rules might include:
• Substantive Rules (truth-telling, confidentiality, privacy,
physician-assisted suicide, informed consent and the like),
• Authority Rules (who may and should perform actions),
• Procedural Rules (rules that establish procedures to be
followed, e.g., determining eligibility for scarce resources,
reporting grievances).
Finally, Beauchamp and Childress introduce elements to contend with
non-universal norms and human idiosyncrasies—these include rights,
the idea of moral character, virtues, the greatest balances of right and
wrong, competing obligations, and even emotions. All of these are
considered vital to the theory and to practical applications, although
they are handmaidens to the Four Principles.
In our discussion, we will focus on the culturally Euro-American
reification of the individual, which is so fundamental to the four principles as to limit its utility for communication in ethical conflicts,
even though the U.S. legal system rests on the concept of individual
rights. The principle of justice affirms the isomorphic relationship
between a principalist approach and Euro-American jurisprudence yet
for patients and families of any cultural or class background, the critical meanings associated with an ethical dilemma may be situated outside the parameters of this narrow ethical/legal domain.
What we will propose is simultaneous attention to the individual
and cultural factors in questions of autonomy, patient rights, and the
decision making process.
Following Marshall and Koenig, we do not “dispute the relevance
of abstract principles in bioethics . . . [but direct our] concern as
anthropologists [to] the everyday practices derived from these
principles, practices that often fall short of realizing the normative
intent of the principles themselves.”12 In particular, we (and they) are
troubled by the unexamined “promulgation of a Westernized bioethics
that fosters only an illusion of global consensus about the morality of
medical practice.”13
As anthropologists, we suggest that the subject of medical ethics
should be the cultural construction of morality, particularly morality
4

Questioning Our Principles

surrounding health and disease. Empiricism is requisite for a just and
informed bioethics—a descriptive bioethics that grounds each case in
its cultural, historical, and political-economic contexts. There are two
main critiques we make: that the individual is so prioritized and
central as to become an unquestioned presumption of care; and that
the notion of a common morality is a false, if not a culturally
imperialist, idea that justifies the devaluation of locally meaningful
moralities. Were one to explore it at a sufficiently high level of
abstraction, one might be able to identify areas of widely shared
values. However, when one gets to the specifics of when certain moral
values can be imposed, then what seems in the abstract to be morally
universal quickly becomes culturally specific. For example, when is it
acceptable to kill? Is it ever acceptable to rape? What constitutes child
abuse? Analysis of local moralities conveys the complexities
associated with these questions.14
Reification Of The Individual
The reification of individual choice in the Principalist approach is
evident in several places:
• In notions of the autonomy of any given individual,
• In the complete preoccupation with a focal “patient”, the single suffering individual,
• And even in biomedically defined “cases” (which have a
hegemonically determined beginning and end).
These assumptions, long the target of critique by medical anthropologists as well as by some medical ethicists, reinforce specific cultural
notions about the target of care, the definition of the patient, and the
responsibilities of various parties involved. These assumptions are
increasingly inappropriate in health care, where patients frequently
come from cultural backgrounds different from their doctors. Helman,
a physician and anthropologist, notes that biomedicine focuses on the
individual patient, or even the individual organ, while ignoring wider
familial, social, and economic issues that render consensus or
problem resolution difficult to achieve.15
Anthropologist Patricia Marshall has suggested that “Bioethics
practices that celebrate only autonomy, with its emphasis on choice,
and downplay social and economic constraints on individual agency,
are out of touch with health-care realities in the U.S., as well as
5
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globally. The changed discourse—doctor becomes provider and
patient becomes consumer—reflects fundamental, systemic problems
characteristic of market-driven medicine.”16 They argue that
conventional individual-focused bioethics practices by themselves,
and without attention to the broader context in which individual
decisions are made, may be inadequate.
Beauchamp and Childress respond to attacks leveled against the
Autonomy Principle by insisting on the individual right to determine
the form and content of care. They write:
We defend a principle of respect for autonomy with a
correlative right to choose (not a mandatory duty to
choose). [A study they describe of 800 subjects from
4 different ethnic groups—Korean American,
Mexican American, European American, and African
American—showed ethnicity to be a primary correlate with attitudes toward disclosure and decisionmaking. But, they go on] . . . [e]ven if the patient
delegates [their decision-making] right to someone
else, the choice to delegate is itself autonomous.17
Patients whose cultural or family context renders them unable or
unwilling to make decisions about their own care can, according to
the principle of autonomy, choose to refuse information about their
health and direct that others will make decisions for them. How and
by whom these interactions will occur is left to guesswork. As
Beauchamp and Childress respond, the only obligation is on the
physician.
There is a fundamental obligation to ensure that
patients have the right to choose, as well as the right
to accept or to decline information. . . . The tricky
practical question is whether it is possible to inform
patients of their rights to know and to decide without
compromising their systems of belief and value or
otherwise disrespecting them.18
A “tricky practical question” indeed. Patient decision-making has
become an obligation in the lived world of hospital- and managedcare and we suggest that a truly moral stance cannot ignore the
context within which ethical theories are played out and must
acknowledge the reality in which its ideals must be rooted.
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That is, to propose as a theoretical principle a concept (i.e., nonobligatory autonomy) that is almost universally disregarded must call
into question the validity of the theory. If patient autonomy is viewed
in the vast majority of settings as not just a right but an obligation of
patients, then this problem demands both theoretical and pragmatic
remedies. The Four Principles approach offers neither.
As we have noted, Beauchamp and Childress do claim
sensitivity to the social determinants of morality and to the function
of judgment applied in individual cases. They say that the four
principles are general norms that leave “considerable room for
judgment in many cases.” In addition, they acknowledge that moral
virtues, paramount in driving decisions for each clinical case, are
socially determined. Yet, they say, we do not approach those cases
tabula rasa but with norms and assumptions informed by culture,
history, and the like.
We suggest that proponents of the principles framework approach
their cases and theory with the same culturally informed assumptions.
They have built a theory that so reifies the individual that no room is
left available in cases for judgments which might contradict these
fundamental assumptions.
Common Morality
The idea of a common, universal morality is not something
readily accepted by anthropologists, and has come under considerable
attack by bioethicists as well. Beauchamp and Childress acknowledge
this when they write:
the common morality’s norms do require interpretation if we are to have workable practical ethics. Such
interpretation is often subject to vigorous dispute in
order to resolve particular problems.19
They acknowledge that not all people accept these norms, but that all
serious people accept them, presumably serious Euro-Americans.
Recent conversations have attempted to align the “common
morality” with notions of basic human rights. Thus, there are basic
human rights (roughly equivalent to the notion of a common
morality) and there is community-specific morality, which takes into
account local variation in what is considered appropriate moral
7
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behavior and motivation. This distinction is far too general to guide
clinical practice.
So to employ the Four Principles approach, we must accept that
humans share innate (i.e., universal) processes or characteristics that
eventuate in a common morality. Anthropologists, trained to be
sensitive to the diversity of human thoughts and values, typically
eschew such assumptions about innateness or universality. Virtually
all schools of anthropology entail an acceptance of at least a weak
form of descriptive relativism. Normative relativism, favored by some
anthropologists, goes a step further in asserting that, because cultures
judge each other according to their own internal standards, there are
no universal standards to judge between cultures.20
Some of the assumptions made under the banner of common
morality include: individualistic thinking—rather than communal,
family, or some other form of thought or orientation; the linearity of
time—rather than cyclical time; the universality of truth telling;
informed consent; definitions of personhood; ownership and
transplantation of body parts; and withholding or withdrawing lifesustaining treatments . . . as moral virtues.21
Ethnographies (that is, anthropological descriptions and analyses
of specific cultures) abound which challenge the appropriateness of
these “beliefs.” These assumptions become very apparent and, often,
problematic in end-of-life care. Barbara Koenig, for example, says
that advance directives assume an ideal patient with
• a clear understanding of the illness, prognosis, and treatment
options shared with the medical team,
• a temporal orientation to the future and a desire to maintain
control over the future,
• a perception of freedom of choice,
• a willingness to discuss death openly.22
This largely represents educated, middle/upper-middle class
Americans. But Smith-Morris’ research among elderly, predominantly Anglo adults in Arizona suggest that even these privileged citizens
are ill-prepared for a more likely end-of-life scenario.23
Alternatives & What Athropology/ists Can Offer
What principles or ethical theory could better address this
plurality? A variety of alternative theories and approaches exist now
8
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for bioethicists to choose from. For example, casuistry, relationshipbased approaches, utilitarianism, character or virtue ethics, and
communitarianism. But few of these provide for the type and depth of
descriptive context we propose, and none address authoritative
knowledge and the power structures within which decisions about
health and health care are made. So if none of these options provide
the solution, what exactly can anthropologists add? Why would
ethnographic data lead to more ethical practice?
Case 2
To explore anthropologists’ potential roles in improving
bioethics, we offer a brief second case.
A young adult male is brought to the ER having swallowed a
Pentium 4 computer chip. He has a history of psychotic episodes. He
now has bowel obstruction but refuses surgery. He apparently wants
to keep the mechanism. A psychiatry consult determines that he is not
competent to make decisions and he is sent to surgery.
Once there, an OR authority questions him to determine if he is
“oriented X 3.” He knows his name, the day, and the president. The
OR nurse then overrides the surgery decision, having determined to
her own satisfaction that he is competent.
In an ethics consult to discuss the decision-making process in this
case, the psychiatry residents mention that while the patient is mildly
retarded, this was not a factor in their determination that he lacked the
capacity to make a decision about surgery. The OR nurse then
vigorously states that if she had known he was retarded, she would
have never questioned the psychiatry decision.
So this case raises questions concerning cultural constructs of
mental illness and mental functioning that affect both popular
thinking and understandings of biomedical professionals outside
psychiatry. It appears from the discussion that the concept of
“retardation” is less contested than that of psychosis, or delusional
states, even within biomedicine.
An ethnography of nurses and doctors in different specialties and
their understandings of psychosis might provide us with information
that could then remedy some of these issues, thus leading to
workshops on what it means to be delusional, especially in relation to
functioning effectively in some domains of social life. This in turn
9
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could enhance the understanding of how decision-making
competence is determined, and the limits of individual autonomy.
That is, anthropologists can add ethnographic detail, informing
ethicists and clinicians of the personal narratives, cultural meanings,
and local moralities that shape decision making. We should note that
the concept of “personal narrative” might suggest an idiosyncratic,
subjective account. However, as Kaufman cogently argues, narratives
are constructed from shared understandings of the cultural world, and
as such, identify important cultural and structural features that shape
individual moral thought and feeling.24
Authoritative Knowledge
A theory of biomedical ethics must step beyond the bounds of
hegemonic assumptions. The principalist approach re-creates and
reinforces the primacy of individualism, rationality, and a bounded
temporal experience of disease while failing to acknowledge power
relations implicit in biomedical decision-making. Authoritative
knowledge is produced, displayed, resisted, and challenged in social,
clinical, and political interactions. Much research, including
Sargent’s,25 demonstrates the links between control of technology
and the hierarchy of relations between specialists and patients. But
research also shows the possibility for interactional cooperation
(alliances) and accommodation in the clinical setting. The
constitution of authoritative knowledge is an ongoing social process;
it constructs and reflects power relationships within a community of
practice. The process by which this occurs is such that all participants
tend to see the current social order as “the way things obviously are.”
These hegemonic forces are what Beauchamp and Childress seem
most blind to. Questions of power in moral and ethical dilemmas—
power between practitioners and patients, power between different
types or fields of practitioners, power within families and cultures—
are marginalized and left unchallenged.
Many bioethicists and clinicians might argue that they have
moved beyond a rigid application of principles to resolve ethical
dilemmas, and rather, engage in flexible negotiations, indeed in a
form of therapeutic intervention in the resolution of such conflicts.
We need to ask, however, what is the ultimate objective of these
negotiations? Often, the implicit, if not explicit goal is to convey
10
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to the patient and/or family the preferred decision of the clinician,
based presumably on medical expertise or institutional concerns
about liability.
Should we consider these “flexible negotiations” a form of benevolent paternalism? We suggest the importance of acknowledging the
authoritative knowledge of the physician, and other biomedical
practitioners. Physicians, whose moral weight and perceived
scientific expertise are linked to formidable medical technologies, are
in a position of power, and rarely in an egalitarian, collaborative
interaction.26 How authoritative knowledge is produced and displayed
in ethical consultations is a question that anthropologists could
usefully address.
A grounded approach to bioethics can be generated by
ethnography. Understanding the patient’s explanatory model can
help bioethicists as well as biomedical practitioners explain that
system to patients/families so that they can make better informed
decisions; decisions that the system in fact requires them to make. For
example, the value placed on the individual in the U.S. creates not an
accidental correspondence between the ethics approach and the legal
protocol; the predominant ethics approach is isomorphic with the
legal system.27
Do ethics consults actually do broader cultural work of furthering
a shared moral order in the context of a multicultural society? If we
inform only the system of the patient’s model, we are reinforcing
medicine as a privileged domain of moral discourse. However, if we
inform patients of cultural details, power dynamics, and institutional
requirements of biomedicine, then they can ask more nuanced
questions and have a better chance of truly participating in an
asymmetric therapeutic interaction.
We propose an alternative for moving between a larger cultural,
historical, or family structure and context to the notion of an
individual as the unit of analysis. We would first re-define “the case.”
The boundedness of the “case” is another unexamined
assumption fundamental in the principalist approach and closely
related to, if not produced by, the reification of individuals. Helman,
for instance, observes that biomedicine is unique in its imposition on
the patient of a linear narrative structure, the “case history.”28
11
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The clinical case—the identified patient, other relevant decisionmakers, even the parameters in a temporal sense (when illness began
and when it ends)—is a manufactured product; a certain telling of the
story amongst many other possible tellings.29 Relegated to the
background are the economic and social contexts of the patient’s life,
cultural factors in the recognition and meaning of illness, potential
stigma, simultaneous (other) healing efforts, etc. Even casuist and
hermeneutic approaches, known for their strident rejection of
principalism, fail to expand the parameters of the case itself.
A procedurally simple change, implemented not after or in the
midst of a crisis (as we so often see in ethics consults), but at the
initial presentation for care—that is, as part of the intake process—
would allow the alignment of patient and clinician expectations to
occur at a more natural point in the relationship. This approach would
involve eliciting the patient’s and family’s explanatory model. An
explanatory model, as first proposed by Arthur Kleinman and later
elaborated by him with Leon Eisenberg and Byron Good, are the
notions about an episode of sickness and its treatment that are
employed by all those engaged in the clinical process. Barry
Hoffmaster adds that patient models reflect social class, cultural
beliefs, education, occupation, religious affiliation, past experience
with illness, and health care.30 Returning to the issue of power
differentials, Helman argues that the power invested in clinicians as a
result of their training and technical expertise often allows them to
shape the patient’s explanatory model to fit the medical model, rather
than allowing the patient’s perspective on illness to emerge.31
Correspondingly, Kleinman, in his groundbreaking book on medicine
as a cultural system, states that
the most difficult aspect of clinical practice to teach to
medical students, interns, and residents is how to
elicit and evaluate objectively patient beliefs and
values with respect to their illnesses and treatments
and to negotiate with (or translate between) these
differing perspectives, in the same way an advisor
gives expert advice to an advisee, who retains the
right to accept, alter, or reject that advice.32
Collecting the explanatory model can be done through a series of
questions like these (see box).
12

Questioning Our Principles

Descriptive Level:
How would you describe the problem that has
brought you to me?
Conceptual Level:
What does the illness do to you? How does it work?
Why do you think it started when it did?
What are the results you hope for? What will
happen if you don’t get treatment?
Apart from me, who else can help you get better?
How can they help?
Personal Level:
Why did you (in particular) get sick?
Adapting this model for a more ethically neutral approach to
health care decision-making might look like this (see box). That is, it
would begin with aspects of decision-making and the values and
beliefs guiding care.
Descriptive Level:
Who else, if anyone, has been or should be involved
in your care?
Conceptual Level:
In cases like yours, what family or friends usually
are involved in decisions?
How are decisions about health care made in your
family/culture/neighborhood?
What do you feel doctors/hospitals should provide
in these cases? (What are your expectations?)
Institutional Protocol (Physician):
Explanation of U.S. biomedical conventions, state
laws, “how the system works,” as appropriate.
Advance directives. Futility concept.
Appropriate vocabulary for culture, social class.
How might ethical decisions change if “cases” came to be viewed
as life stories, family events, or other ongoing narrative? A grounded
approach that is informed by ethnographic information would reliably
13
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attend to the structural, institutional, and procedural barriers that
worsen—and in many cases produce—ethical dilemmas in health
care. Armed with this information, clinicians and institutions would
at least have insight into problematic arenas requiring changes. A
final case will demonstrate what we suggest.
Case 3
A doctor writes to an ethics committee requesting a discussion of
patients who behave abusively to doctors and nurses. The committee,
composed of doctors, nurses, social workers, chaplains, and
community representatives, agrees that this is an important issue. The
anthropologist present asks, “Who are the abusers?” The response
from one prominent and respected physician is “generic scumbags.”
The anthropologist suggests a survey in which, when a case arises, the
following information is reported to a central source: age, sex,
ethnicity of patient, medical condition, and circumstances/context
when incident occurred. Committee members are not interested,
deciding rather to ask for a consult with psychiatry on how to manage
disruptive patients. For them, a key ethical issue is whether it is
acceptable to call security for such a patient (with exceptions made
for someone with dementia or on drugs).
Management of the abusive patients, certainly a reasonable
concern, becomes the core issue of discussion. What we lack,
however, is any data on precisely who these “abusers” might be (we
might speculate on age, sex, insurance status) and in what sorts of
situations abusive behavior might emerge. Eliciting and analyzing
this information might then provide us with a means to address the
fundamental, underlying causes of disruptive behavior, and therefore
to identify possible structural factors implicated in these scenarios.
Closing
Bioethics is a field now dominated by premises of western
philosophical thought; principles and rights-based approaches that
have reinforced a “pervasive reductionism, utilitarianism, and
ethnocentrism in the field.”33 Originally bioethics was intended to
empower patients in the context of a rights-based approach, which
would allow patients to reclaim power from biomedical expertise. It
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is ironic that this effort to generate empowerment has had such
mixed results.34
We suggest that incorporating an ethnographic approach in
ethical analysis would challenge ethicists to pay greater attention to
how moral concepts are embedded in social practice, and how
biomedical practitioners and institutional patterns shape the
production and experience of ethical dilemmas.35
Value neutrality is untenable in a “real world” bioethics. But
anthropologists can effect change both directly (in communication
with patients and practitioners) and by advocating for structural
change that might have broader impact. For example,
decentralization of primary care services might allow patients to
develop therapeutic relationships and alliances that would limit
disruptive behavior, and intake and consent-gathering procedures that
incorporate a larger network of those invested might forestall later
crises and disputes.
What we need are theories of bioethics that do not reproduce, in
an unexamined way, the assumptions of a single cultural paradigm.
We would benefit from forms of pedagogy that integrate
anthropological and other social science perspectives as well as the
incorporation of ethnographic techniques in ethical practice—to
situate problems in biomedical, familial, and interpersonal contexts.
There are no simple and formulaic models that can address diverse
cultural differences. We are suggesting the need for further crossdisciplinary talk about “how to talk” with the ultimate objective
of generating informed and collaborative negotiation of critical
life issues.
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